for example, trump yells "build a wall" and various other things and somehow convinces people to vote for him. somehow his words induce a brainstate.
formal language, natural language, logic are all insufficiently powerful to analyze this kind of communication. human brains have something to do with formal language and formal logic, but there are a lot of more powerful effects.
until you invoke the existence of brains that hypothesize the existence of mexican brains and furthermore are racist against them, you won't have a good understanding of what "build a wall" means. because "build a wall" as im talking about here is an abstraction in a brain.
You absolutely cannot. The formal assumptions of empiricism proves that you can't if thought is entirely materially based.
No, they are precisely the mathematical ideals. That's because there is no transition from metaphysical to material and because it's in a well-formed formal language. There is loss in scientific theory because you take metaphysical mathematics and use it to describe material objects and phenomena
Because there's the concept of well-formed languages. Read the SEP article on set theory.
Absolutely wrong. If math is composed of metaphysical objects, then thought must have a metaphysical component and can't be entirely contained in the material. That's basic empiricism
We aren't, really. There's a reason natural language is how we express ourselves and not formal language
This is true. But mathematical objects being real and metaphysical probably shows that thought is metaphysical. Language arises from and is composed in thought, so it cannot be contained in the brain alone.
Wrong. There is no empirical observation without a metaphysical element because comprehension requires thought, which mathematical realism shows is metaphysical.
You don't buy anything with this distinction. It's already assumed.
You are using systems that directly access mathematical objects, which we've shown have a real, metaphysical existence. Stop making claims without reading the short summary of Gödel's proofs on this I linked
This absolutely has to be justified. It is not intuitive nor is it common-sense (even though neither of those suffices as a justification).
Hey, dumbass, mathematical objects that are metaphysically real are abstract objects. If we understand the world as an abstraction, for the same reason math is composed of real metaphysical objects, the abstractions of the world are also real metaphysical objects.
the cognitive unit that does reasoning is a poor abstraction for practical things. because its off, most of the time. you turn it on when youre doing math or philosophy or strategizing and most of the time youre on autopilot, working off of weaker heuristics.
the world is not contained in your brain. there is a world. you have an idea of the world in your brain. the idea of the world is not the world. you cannot access the world directly. if you assume a cognitive unit, it operates only on the idea of the world. which is related to, but not exactly, the world.
This makes no sense. If the cognitive unit can ever process things that are metaphysical and do so without loss (as it does with mathematics), it necessarily is metaphysical.
This is an argument that cognition necessarily operates in a metaphysical space
This is true. But mathematical objects being real and metaphysical probably shows that thought is metaphysical. Language arises from and is composed in thought, so it cannot be contained in the brain alone.
if you postulate there exist mathematical objects, then your thought is not directly accessing them. the resolution is that your thought is not metaphysical and neither are the conceptual mathematical objects in your head, which are related to but not exactly the metaphysical mathematical objects. drugged mathematician.
if godel thinks we are accessing metaphysical mathematical objects directly i think he is wrong.
a computer program, can in principle, do this too.
a computer program acquires some information about the world, builds a map of the world which is not the world, and does cognitive operations on the map as a representation of the world.
if you conclude that the computer program's operation is therefore metaphysical, thats fine with me, except i think the definition is not very useful.
do you really think the cognitive unit processes mathematics without loss? there are lots of people wrong about mathematics... its mildly arrogant in general to assume you are not drugged and delusional at any given time, but you kind of have to assume so in order to function. so we do.
This is a pretty good example of how your approach is self centered. I will explain.
It is provably true.
They provably do. Our formal languages that describe real, metaphysical mathematical objects and structures provably are isomorphic to those structures. Read the Gödel citation. It's provable, not an opinion.
This is not true. Because we don't accept something mathematics without proof.
You don't understand how first and second order logics and proofs work. You are asserting opinions that contradict logically provable statements. Either you accept the addition of extrinsic axioms to set-theoretic universes or thought can be entirely physically based. You provably can't have both
You don't understand how first and second order logics and proofs work. You are asserting opinions that contradict logically provable statements. Either you accept the addition of extrinsic axioms to set-theoretic universes or thought can be entirely physically based. You provably can't have both
i can have both because i declare i can have both. even if its logically incoherent, i can still think that way. suppose what youre saying is actual metaphysical truth. but i dont vibe with them. thus, my thoughts do not access the metaphysical truth. they are merely related to it in some way.
that was just an example. i think as well that its logically coherent. but i could be wrong!
maybe you can say that i am cogniting incorrectly, or nonmathematically, or otherwise doing it wrong. but then its unclear to me how you could presume anyone is doing it 100% right.
Imagine being named Phil while working in the field of philosophy
Phil Osophy
Our formal languages that describe real, metaphysical mathematical objects and structures provably are isomorphic to those structures.
you dont operate directly on the formal structures. nobody is a perfect formal language processor. most people with some training can approximate formal language processors that may occasionally make mistakes.
the flesh is weak. there is no mind beyond the flesh. the mind is weak. your ideas are impure.
you could ignore all this and keep doing mathematics. i recommend that. but if you ignore all this and do linguistics you will never understand what "build a wall" really means.